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Public Defenders, Local Control,
and Brown v. Board of Education
by Russell C. Gabriel*
The topics the Mercer Law Review Symposium addresses-race,
history, criminal law, and the South-have a long reach across time,
place, and the spectrum of justice. It is both temptingly easy and
distressfully complicated to disentangle the strands of the Southern
tapestry, woven from past to present. The theory of this Essay is the
easy part. Evaluating the correctness of the theory is more complicated.
I am indebted to Mercer Law Review for inviting the effort.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainright'
and told the states that they were required to provide lawyers to poor
defendants accused of violating the state's criminal laws,2 it must have
sounded familiar to the Southern ear. In the march of Brown v. Board
of Education' and subsequent events, the federal courts became the
familiar trumpet of the unwanted Northern and national government.
In that light, it should not be surprising that the imposition of a
national standard of criminal defense representation has difficultly
making headway in the South. The criminal justice system, a quintessentially local enterprise, is highly resistant to outside meddling. And the
Southern criminal justice system, historically a cornerstone and a brutal

* Director, Criminal Defense Clinic, University of Georgia, and formerly the Director
of the Public Defender Office for the Western Judicial Circuit in Athens, Georgia.
University of Michigan (B.A., with honors, 1978); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude,
1985); Harvard University (LL.M., 1987). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Id. at 344.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I, the "holding") and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II, the
"remedy").
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overseer of the status quo,' had little cultural, political, or legal
incentive to concede power to the federal courts or even the centralized
state governments. To some extent, that fealty to local control continues
to retard progress in developing robust systems of indigent defense
representation in the South. My goal here is to illustrate that point,
particularly with reference to Georgia.
The basic premise is this: the South has long battled to keep power
localized. The reliance on localized power structures enabled the
construction, maintenance, and preservation of a racial caste system.
Where stability of society's fundamental institutions and culture means
the maintenance of the racial caste system, bringing lawbreakers "to
justice" means, among other things, punishing those who transgress the
boundaries of racial caste. Rule breakers are those who do not "know
their place." Localized power exercised through the criminal justice
system was a primary vehicle for the enforcement of Southern justice.
Providing zealous legal advocacy for criminal defendants is a challenge
to the pattern and practice in many local court systems, and therefore
a challenge to those in traditional positions of authority-including
judges, prosecuting attorneys, and police. The South today relies on
local control of legal advocacy for poor defendants, who are disproportionately people of color.
This invites inquiry, given the South's
historical reliance on the culture of local control to perpetuate racial
oppression.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. First, it describes the use of local
control in the South as a tool for enforcing racial hierarchy. Evidence of
the Southern attachment to local, rather than centralized power,
abounds, and it is not likely a matter in dispute. Nonetheless, examples
from a few different eras help illustrate how local control has been
deployed. Second, the Essay describes the development of national
standards for indigent defense delivery systems and for the performance
of criminal defense lawyers. National organizations, including the
American Bar Association (ABA), the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA), and the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ), have drafted and approved standards that apply to the various
actors in the criminal justice system-judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, law enforcement and others-out of concern that state
systems need significant improvement. Third, the Essay describes

4. See, e.g., Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198 (1853) (Lumpkin, J., majority opinion)
("[T]he status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free, is such that he has no civil,
social or political rights or capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed on him by
Statute. . . ."); see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 153 (3d rev.
ed. 1974).
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Georgia's use of local control as the organizational unit for indigent
defense, the rise and fall of deference to a centralized system, and to a
belief in uniform national, or even state, performance standards to guide
the practice of criminal defense lawyers handling indigent cases.
II.

THE TRADITION OF LOCAL CONTROL

James Madison, in Federalist No. 10,' described the benefits of
national decision-making over state, and state over local. In his view,
the smaller the community, the easier it is for a single faction or group
to take and maintain control and "execute their plans of oppression."'
The diversity of interests that convene when the decision-makers come
from a larger geographic area reduces the risk that a single faction will
control, to the detriment of all others.
A modern voice, Thomas Klevin, summarizes two counter-arguments:
The theory is that local autonomy enhances democracy by bringing
government closer to the people, thereby producing a government more
responsive to their needs. Local autonomy also promotes pluralism as
a democratic value by enabling smaller groups of people to pursue
common interests that might otherwise be overwhelmed in larger and
more heterogeneous settings.'
However, Klevin qualifies the above with the following: "But local control
also gives rise to self-interested behavior that adversely affects the lesswell-off and ethnic minorities. When this happens, it contributes to
systemic classism and racism."9
Jennifer Nedelsky puts the factional issue this way:
Should we be persuaded that those on the outside of ... privileges
have a better chance of changing the status quo at the local level,
where participation has been built around long-standing relations of
power and privilege, or at the national level, where there are likely to
be different relations of power and privilege? . .. While I am persuaded that racism in the United States was particularly pernicious because
there was no real way of exiting from those relations of power and
privilege, it also is the case that racism is conventionally the chief
example used to show the efficacy of the federal government in
overcoming local majority tyranny. I am not persuaded that the Anti-

5. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008). Id. at 54.
6. Id. at 54.
7.

Id.

8. Thomas Klevin, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 207, 216 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
9. Id. at 216 (footnote omitted).
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Federalists ever adequately faced the problem of entrenched power in
local politics.'o

Local control is a dominant theme in Southern political identity, and
necessarily is associated with the perpetuation of racial slavery, racial
segregation, and racial discrimination. The maintenance of those
systems of racial caste required that all the mechanisms of the
culture-official and non-official, public and private, violent and nonviolent, sophisticated and vulgar-be deployed in service of the
hierarchy.n
Of these mechanisms, mob rule and lynching were the most dramatic.
If today we speak of "microaggressions,"12 lynching was the paradigm
of macroaggression.
It was notoriously extra-legal, yet relatively
common. There were at least 3959 lynchings in the Southern states
between 1877 and 1950."* Some may wish to exclude the lawless
practice of lynching from debates over local versus centralized control.
However, the South has flown the flag of local control and its national
analog, state's rights (or "anti-federalism"), consistently, adamantly, and
proudly as it defended its right to maintain a society organized by racial
caste. Given the reliance on lynching, among other practices, to enforce
the caste system, it would be disingenuous, if not disloyal, to exclude
this definitive marker of the Southern cultural landscape.'
Lynching occurred for a variety of reasons-some for murders alleged,
some for racial etiquette transgressed. A recent report on lynching done
by the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama describes,
among the range of explanations, lynching imposed for behavior as petty
as "referring to a white police officer by his name without the title of
'mister'" (Alabama); returning from World War I and "refusing to take
off his Army uniform" (Georgia); and "accidentally bumping into a white
girl as he ran to catch a train" (Mississippi)."

10.

Jennifer Nedelsky, Democracy, Justice, and the Multiplicity of Voices: Alternatives

to the FederalistVision, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 232, 238 (1989).
11. WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 7.
12. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (discussing
the term).
13.

EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF

RACIAL TERROR, SHORT REPORT at 4-5 (2015).
14. For an especially moving description of the lynching image see Abel Meeropol,
Strange Fruit, reprinted in DAVID MARGOLICK, STRANGE FRUIT: BILLY HOLIDAY, THE CAFE
SOCIETY, AND AN EARLY CRY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 15 (2000). The poem was made famous in
a recording by Billie Holiday and has since been sung and recorded by many other artists.

See generally id.
15.

See LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 32.

20161

PUBLIC DEFENDERS

629

Regardless of the "rationale" for any particular lynching, the practice
was integral to maintaining the status quo. Lynchings were communicative acts, performed before large audiences, and publicized throughout
the region:
[Olver time lynching spectacles evolved a well-known structure, a
sequence and pace of events that southerners came to understand as
standard. The well-choreographed spectacle opened with a chase or a
jail attack, followed rapidly by the public identification of the captured
African American by the alleged white victim or victim's relatives,
announcements of the upcoming event to draw the crowd, and selection
and preparation of the site. The main event then began with a period
of mutilation-often including emasculation-and torture to extract
confessions and entertain the crowd, and built to a climax of slow
burning, hanging, and/or shooting to complete the killing. The finale
consisted of frenzied souvenir gathering and display of the body and
the collected parts."6
Some lynchings occurred not without, but in response to, judicial
proceedings.
For example, the lynching of Leo Frank in 1915 in
Marietta, Georgia occurred after he was convicted and sentenced to
death in a court of law." A white mob from Marietta was outraged
when the Governor commuted Frank's sentence to life, so they abducted
Frank from the prison farm where he was housed, returned him to
Marietta, and hung him."
A similar post-conviction lynching occurred in Chattanooga, Tennessee
in 1906. Ed Johnson, an African American man, was convicted of the
rape of a young white woman despite exceptionally questionable
evidence. Johnson was sentenced to death. When the United States
Supreme Court issued a stay of Johnson's execution, white citizens in
Chattanooga were outraged." They abducted Johnson from the jail,
hung him from a bridge, and shot him. His body was left for public
display, pinned to it was a note: "To Justice Harlan. Come and get your
n_-- now." 20
As the century moved along, the South learned that it could obtain
nearly the same results as lynching through the use of the judicial

16.

GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN

THE SOUTH, 1890-1940, 203-04 (1998) (quoted in
SCOrSBORO 9 (2009)).

JAMES A. MILLER, REMEMBERING

17. See Douglas Linder, The Trial of Leo Frank: An Account (2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1305212.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. See Douglas Linder, The Trial of Sheriff Joseph Shipp, et al.: An Account (2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1023973; see also United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
20. Linder, The Trial of Leo Frank, supra note 17, at 7.
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system. It merely required waiting a bit (though, as the Johnson and
Frank cases illustrate, not every community could abide the wait).
The transition from lynching outside of court to speedy conviction and
death sentence inside of court was famously displayed in Powell v.
Alabama,2 1 otherwise known as the Scottsboro case.22 Nine young
black men were accused of the rape of two young white women on a
freight train crossing Alabama in 1931. Publicity surrounding the
charges, the trials, and subsequent events was immense. The sheriff's
department in the town where the train stopped deputized every white
man in town who owned a gun to assist in the arrest.23 The prosecu-

tion was rapid, and fifteen days after their arrest the young men had
been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in trials that lasted no
more than a day.24 The trials attracted a crowd of over 1500, most of
whom would not fit into the courthouse, and they cheered when the
verdicts were announced.25 Defense lawyers were barely provided to the
defendants, resulting in the reversal of the convictions by the United
States Supreme Court." This in turn produced even more outrage in
Alabama, where the citizenry thought they had acted with admirable
restraint for having a trial at all.27 The white citizenry, at least the
men who sat on the juries, understood that the purpose of the public
trial was to reinforce the racial caste. In that light, it is not surprising
that the young men were re-convicted in subsequent trials, even though
medical testimony contradicted the rape allegations and one of the two
accusers testified that the whole story was a fiction.28
Quite apart from lynching without any legal process or capital
punishment with skeletal due process, the economic system in the Deep
South had a daily impact on racial relations and the maintenance of
white status. Following the demise of slavery, the South grew to rely
on convict labor and continued to do so in one form or another until at
least the 1940s. 2 9 A federal judge in Alabama described this system as
follows:

21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. See generally MILLER, supra note 16.
23. Id. at 9-10.
24. See generally id. at 7, 10.
25. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 37 (1969).
26. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
27. See Michael Klarman, The Racial Originsof Modern CriminalProcedure,99 MICH.
L. REV. 48, 54 (2000).
28. CARTER, supra note 25, at 192-239.
29. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME 375 (2008).
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The plan is to accuse the negro of some petty offense, and then require
him, in order to escape conviction, to enter into an agreement to pay
his accuser so much money, and sign a contract, under the terms of
which his bondsmen can hire him out until he pays a certain sum. The
negro is made to believe he is a convict, and treated as such. It is said
that thirty negroes were in the stockade at one time."

The mechanics of this scheme varied, but the involvement of a municipal
or other lower court judge was essential to the process. 31 Abduction via
the judicial system into forced contract labor was not only slavery by
another name 32 but also a tool of racial terror used to enforce the Jim
Crow caste system. Local police or sheriffs colluded with local judges to
arrest, convict, and arrange labor contracts with owners of local
commercial enterprises. 3 Prosecution of such local personalities, which
hinged on the willingness of local juries to convict white men, was nearly
impossible.' Sentencing to county chain gangs was merely a variation
on this process."
Well after the convict labor system had passed into disuse, local justice
systems still relied on small cases to maintain the racial order as much
as they did large cases.
Misdemeanor prosecutions that would be
mundane are more significant when understood as public reminders of
racial caste and penalties for breaking with the white-ordained status
quo.
36
The case of Duncan v. Louisiana
is a good example-a simple
misdemeanor case famous beyond Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana only
because it reached the United States Supreme Court." The legal issue

30. Id. at 171.
31. See Jamison v. Wimbish, 130 F. 351 (S.D. Ga. 1904). The court reversed the
conviction of a middle-aged black man by the "police magistrate" in Macon, Georgia. Id.
at 352-53. The decision describes an arrest, trial, and sentence all occurring within a single
day. Id. at 352. By the next day the defendant was wearing shackles and chains and
working on the county chain gang. Id. at 352-53. The habeas decision was summarily
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court due to the failure of the defendant to exhaust state
remedies prior to seeking relief in federal court. Wimbish v. Jamison, 199 U.S. 599, 599
(1905).
32. BLACKMON, supra note 29, at 64-65.

33.

See generally id.

34. Id. at 155-232. Repeated attempts to prosecute various actors in these schemes
were largely frustrated due to community pressure on prosecutors to cease and desist,
witnesses' fear of reprisal for testifying, and the reluctance of jurors to convict white
defendants if a case actually went to trial.
35. See, e.g., Wimbish, 130 F. at 353.
36. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. Id. at 146.
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in Duncan was whether the constitutional right to a jury trial in
criminal cases applied to the states.3 s However, the underlying
circumstances-the abuse of local power in order to enforce a racial
regime, and the willingness of the state appellate courts to condone such
use of the criminal law system-provides a window into the routine use
of local courts to enforce the racial order. By 1968, the abuse of legal
process by Southern courts was a national news narrative and that
growing national awareness and concern gave legitimacy to Supreme
Court reversals of state court convictions."
Gary Duncan, age twenty-one and African American, was accused of
touching one of four white boys who were harassing Duncan's twelveyear-old cousin and a friend.' The two twelve-year-olds had just begun
to attend the formerly all-white high school. In the process of stopping
the altercation, Duncan touched one of the white boys on the arm. The
president of the white private school association, who was watching but
had not intervened to stop the harassment, called the police and Duncan
was arrested."'
A less well-known part of the Duncan story is that the district
attorney also prosecuted Duncan's defense lawyer, Richard Sobol.42
Sobol was not admitted to practice in Louisiana, but he had associated
Louisiana counsel on the case. However, that attorney was African
American, and the white trial judge refused to allow him to appear in
his court.
After the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Duncan's
appeal and Sobol announced his client's intention to seek United States
Supreme Court review, the district attorney had Sobol arrested and

38. Id. at 146-47. Gary Duncan was charged with simple battery, a charge for which
he was not entitled to a jury trial under Louisiana law, though it carried a possible
sentence of two years in prison. Id. The Court held that the right to a jury trial was
fundamental to due process and therefore applicable to the states. Id. at 146, 149-50.
39. Klarman, supra note 27, at 92.
40. The description of Duncan and related events is taken from the following, unless
otherwise noted: Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to
the FederalRegulation of State Juries, in CRD4INAL PROCEDURE STORIEs 261-93 (Carol S.
Steiker ed., 2006).
41. Id.
42. See Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 395 (E.D. La. 1968). This was Sobol's
successful suit seeking injunctive relief from the prosecution. See id. Sobol, on leave from
the firm of Arnold and Porter in Washington, D.C., was working for the Lawyers
Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC). Id.
43. The stated reason was that a partner at Sobol's associated Louisiana Counsel's firm
was an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, and a Louisiana statute would bar the
partner from practicing in this matter. So long as the partner was so employed, the local
judge in the Duncan case would not allow any of the firm's partners to practice before him
either. Id. at 397-98.
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charged him with the unauthorized practice of law. Sobol successfully
obtained a federal court order to enjoin the prosecution." The federal
court concluded:
This prosecution is so unusual that, according to attorneys who
testified in the case, the statute to their recollection had never
previously been invoked against a visiting attorney. This prosecution
was meant to show Sobol that civil rights lawyers were not welcome in
the parish, and that their defense of Negroes involved in cases growing
out of civil rights efforts would not be tolerated. It was meant also as
a warning to other civil rights lawyers and to Negroes in the parish
who might consider retaining civil rights lawyers to advance their
rights to equal opportunity and equal treatment under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The fact that the local courts were enforcers of the racial status quo
is important to the present inquiry. However, it is critical to note that
the courts were far from alone in this endeavor. There was a well
understood expectation that diverse methods, private and public, must
work in collaboration to maintain the culture of whitesupremacy.'
Some examples remain notorious; others are more obscure. In combination, they were ubiquitous.
For instance, a variety of methods for suppressing the African
American vote are commonly known-the poll tax, the discriminatory
literacy test for voter registration, the use of physical intimidation that
was nothing short of terrorism."' Even where voter registration rules
were race-neutral, the use of local decision-makers to determine voter
eligibility allowed local jurisdictions to continue to suppress the black
vote.48
A less well known example is the use of local, all white committees in
the administration of the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) loans and credit, which enabled systemic racial discrimination
in the administration of USDA loans, a practice extending through the
Reagan administration.4 9 Similarly, the distribution of education and

44. Id. at 398, 402.
45. Id. at 402.
46. WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 6-8.
47. Sobol, 289 F. Supp. at 141.
48. See, e.g., Davis v. Schell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (S.D. Ala. 1949). For examples
of literacy tests given prior to the Voting Rights Act, see, e.g., Voting Rights-Are You
"Qualified"toVote?, VETERANS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, http://www.crmvet.org/in
fo/lithome.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
49. See, e.g., Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 112-13 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that
local decision-makers, overwhelmingly white, discriminated against African American
farmers in approving the United States Department of Agriculture loan, credit, and other
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housing benefits to returning World War II veterans under the G.I. Bill
was determined by local decision-makers, throughout the country these
were overwhelmingly white. This use of local decision-makers, in
combination with existing segregation in higher education and residential housing, resulted in huge racial disparities in the receipt of G.I. Bill
benefits."o
However, the Southern reactions to Brown, may be the best known
examples of white resistance to the imposition of standards from "outside
agitators."" That resistance was both local and state, by public actors
and private actors, working independently and in combination."2 As
William Nelson put it:
When John W. Davis argued for the various school boards in Brown v.
Board of Education that "the very strength and fiber of our federal
system is local self-government" under the control of "those most
immediately affected by it," he struck a responsive chord in the South
where local self-rule had real meaning.
But localism inspired
Southerners because of the substantive ends it furthered--ends
fundamentally racist in nature. Only forces outside Southern communities had the capacity to end white repression of blacks in the South,
and preservation of local autonomy offered a means of continuing the
exclusion of outsiders from Southern political life and thereby
preserving white insiders' hegemony over blacks. Localism has, indeed,
typically been connected to racism, nativism and other sorts of
xenophobia in American history."
Two responses of particular relevance to Georgia are illustrative: The
Southern Manifesto was a prominent public response to Brown from the
upper ranks of white southern leadership.
It was presented in
Congress by nineteen Senators and eighty-two Congressmen, including
Georgia Senators Richard B. Russell and Walter F. George. Senator

programs, and approving the settlement agreement in the class action litigation).
50. Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other
Inconvenient Truths Undermine the Supreme Court'sAffirmative Action Jurisprudence,75

U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 593, 596, 600, 601 (2014).
51. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (finding racial segregation in public schools violates the
equal protection clause) and Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (ordering desegregation to proceed
"with all deliberate speed").
52. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (school board in Little Rock, Arkansas
seeking to comply with the Brown case but State government actively resisting
compliance).
53.

William E. Nelson, The Role of History in Interpreting the FourteenthAmendment,

25 Loy. L. A. L. REv. 1177, 1181-82 (1992).
54. Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 84th Cong., 102 CONG. REC. 4565 (1956)
(the "Southern Manifesto").
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George had been Georgia's senator since 1922, and he introduced the
Southern Manifesto on the Senate floor in 1956." In part, it stated:
In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,in 1896, the Supreme Court expressly
declared that under the 14th amendment no person was denied any of
his rights if the States provided separate but equal public facilities
....

This interpretation, restated time and again, became a part of

the life of the people of many of the States and confirmed their habits,
customs, traditions, and way of life .. .. This unwarranted exercise of

power by the Court, contrary to the Constitution, is creating chaos and
confusion in the States principally affected. It is destroying the
amicable relations between the white and Negro races that have been
created through 90 years of patient effort by the good people of both
races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where there has been
heretofore friendship and understanding. Without regard to the
consent of the governed, outside agitators are threatening immediate
and revolutionary changes in our public-school systems. If done, this
is certain to destroy the system of public education in some of the
States. 6
The reaction combines the false narrative of amicable relations between
the races with an appeal to insider politics and local control, threatened
by outsider politics imposed through the national constitution as
interpreted by the national courts. This is the classic plea for local
control of the sort that concerned James Madison. It was a plea not
backed by a legitimate local consensus, given the exclusion of minority
voices from the local body politic.
A similar response from the upper ranks of the white southern
leadership can be found in a 1956 Advisory Opinion of the Georgia
Attorney General Eugene Cook." The opinion explained why Georgia
and the individual school systems within it were not legally obligated to
comply with Brown:
Georgia was not a party to the Segregation Cases, and declined to
participate upon invitation as friend of the Court. In so refusing, it
was sought by responsible state officials to not only avoid any possible
holding that we had thereby become bound, but to give solemn recognition to the policy of this state as evidenced by the action of the
legislature and people in making it clear in no uncertain terms that
segregation would not be abolished in our public school system. There

55. Id. at 4516.
56. Id.
57. See Ga. Op. Att'y Gen., The Segregation Laws of Georgia Are Still In Effect (Sept.
2, 1955), in COMPILATION OF GEORGIA LAWS AND OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RELATING TO SEGREGATION OF THE RACES 86-88 (State Law Dep't ed., 1956).
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are both constitutional and statutory provisions in the laws of this
state which require segregation in our public school system. Since
Georgia was not party to these suits, these laws are still in effect, and
until they are declared otherwise, are presumed to be constitutional
.... Even should a suit be brought in Georgia, any action could affect
only one of Georgia's 201 systems. To bind all of these systems, 201
separate suits would have to be brought.'

This was an invitation and direction to litigate school desegregation, not
with the expectation of achieving a good outcome but with the intention
of delaying a bad one (from the point of view of the Attorney General
and his white constituency). It relied on the fact that the structure of
local control had the strategic purpose of insulating local actors from
national-or even state-governance.
Indeed, the Georgia legislature demonstrated an acute awareness of
Immediately after Brown, the Georgia
such local independence.
legislature enacted legislation to defund any local school system that
desegregated," to provide vouchers to parents who sent their children
to private schools that arose in a desegregated school system," and to

allow public school teachers to maintain participation in the state
teacher retirement system if they moved to private schools in desegregat-

ed districts."

This is not to say that Georgia was alone in its attempt

to counter Brown via state legislation. It was a shared effort amongst
most of the Southern states.6 2

By the era of Brown, the South was adept at deploying the antifederalist narrative in the campaign to resist cultural and political

change. It had been practicing since the Civil War, if not since the
founding of the country. By the 1950s, though the carpetbaggers may
have been gone, the federal courts were viewed as their descendants, and
just as unwelcome.
For this reason, we should be cautious when local control is relied

upon to shape the public defender system, whose purpose is to give voice
to indigent criminal defendants. The present-day criminal law system
may not be synonymous with racial segregation, private and public
convict labor, or slavery. However, our modern reliance on the criminal

58. Id. at 88.
59. See 1956 Ga. Laws 753, 762 (Statutes and Law Related to Segregation Appropriations Act) and 1955 Ga. Laws 174 (Statutes and Law related to Separation of Races).
60. 1956 Ga. Laws 6, 7 (Closing of Public School Systems).
61. 1956 Ga. Laws 13 (Teachers' Retirement System Amendment).
62. See, e.g., Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8-9. Arkansas amended its state constitution to
require the state legislature to pass legislation opposing Brown's desegregation mandate.
See generally WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 154-60.
63. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 154-60.
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courts to impose mass incarceration" resonates with those past
practices that were critical to the maintenance of racial caste. The
modern criminal justice system removes tens of thousands of people,
disproportionately removing racial minorities and men, from society, and
places them into prison work camps, houses, barracks, cells, and
isolation.
This is one of the current versions of lawful segregation.' The
cultural legitimization of this segregation rests on confidence in a
judgment that the individual has broken the law, and a willingness to
conclude that therefore the individual is lacking in character, dangerous
to others, and deserving of punishment. The legal legitimization is that
punishment for crime may be imposed so long as it is done pursuant to
due process of law. This segregation is not reserved exclusively for
people of color, but it is heavily weighted in that direction. 6 And
certainly it is heavily weighted to incarcerate the poor and the powerless, regardless of race or gender. Eighty percent of criminal defendants
are indigent.6 7
If the status quo players in power are the arrest-free, the people at the
bottom of the social ladder are the indigent criminal defendants. In the
era of mass incarceration, that is, the era of unprecedented reliance on
the criminal law to impose judgment and thereby create cultural and
economic identity, a robust defense of those on the bottom rung implies
social upheaval. That social upheaval, no less than desegregation,
challenges the existing conceptions of authority, achievement, and rank.

64. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2012).

65. The prison population in Georgia is 61.5% African American, 33.8% White, and
4.2% Hispanic. Annual Report FY2014, GA. DEP'T OF CORR., at 8, available at http//ww
w.dcor.ga.us/AboutGDC/AgencyOverview/pdf/AnnualReportFY14.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2016). The state population as a whole is 31.5% African American and 62.1% White. State
and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13
000.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2015). The United States is 77.4% White (62.4% nonHispanic White) and 13.2% African American. Id. The U.S. prison population is reported
as 40% African American, 39% White non-Hispanic, and 19% Hispanic. Leah Sakala,
Breaking Down Mass Incarcerationin the 2010 U.S. Census, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE
(May 28, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html.
66. Sakala, supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases:
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). Note the number of defendants
who are indigent need not match the number of defendants who have government-paid
counsel. Some percentage of inmates represent themselves, and likely a significant number
in misdemeanor cases, see, e.g., CAROLINE W. HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000), and some percentage
of indigent persons have extended family members or friends who hire a lawyer for them,
though the family members are under no legal obligation to do so.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STANDARDS:
AN ETHIC OF CONCERN

In 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright," the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that due process requires the States to provide legal
representation to poor persons in criminal cases." In doing so, the
Court imposed an obligation to provide thousands of lawyers to hundreds
of thousands of criminal defendants.
While the Court was deliberating Gideon, the Criminal Law Section
of the ABA began the project of drafting what would become the ABA
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice." These standards covered seventeen different criminal justice topics, of which
criminal defense representation was but one.' This initiative marked
the first time the ABA had formulated standards in the area of criminal
justice,72 and it reflected growing national concern about the fairness
of the criminal justice system." As the project reached completion in
1974, Chief Justice Warren Burger said:
These Standards offer the best prospect of meaningful improvement of
our criminal justice system in this generation and their implementation
should be a high priority of the entire legal community. Realizing the
full potential of these Standards requires the joint and sustained effort
of the bench, the bar, the law schools, and the lay community. This
project represents, I believe, the single most comprehensive and
probably the most monumental undertaking in the field of criminal
justice ever attempted by the American legal profession ....

68.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

69. Id. at 344.
70. William J. Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA
Standardsfor CriminalJustice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 255 (1974).
71. Id. at 256. "Standards Relating to the Prosecution and Defense Functions" were
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1971. Id. at 259 n.16. Other standards

included:

.

Standards Relating To Appellate Review Of Sentences, ... Post-Conviction
Remedies,... Fair Trial and Free Press,... Pleas Of Guilty,... Speedy Trial,
...
Providing Defense Services, . . . Joinder and Severance, . . . Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures, . . . Pretrial Release, . . . Criminal Appeals, . .
Probation, . .. Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, . .. Electronic Surveillance,
... the Function of the Trial Judge, . . . and to the Urban Police Function."
Id. at 259-60 nn.14-18.
72. See id. at 255.
73. See id. at 255-56.
74. Warren E. Burger, Introduction:The ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251 (1974). See generally Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards:Forty Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10 (2009).
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The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice now number twenty-five in
total." Standards for the Defense Function have been revised three
times since their original adoption in 1971, most recently in 2015.76
Though local and state governments were slow to respond to the
command of Gideon, defender advocates and public interest actors were
not. These groups, primarily lawyers, quickly understood the systemic
implications of Gideon. In addition to the performance standard
approach taken by the ABA, these groups created guidelines and models
for administration of indigent defense systems.
Even slightly before Gideon, in 1959, the Conference of Uniform Laws
Commissioners released a Model Defender Act," and by 1970 it had
published the "Model Public Defender Act."7 8 One of the two stated
purposes of that Act was to recommend that states shift from local
control of indigent defense to state-wide public defender systems. 79 In
other words, at least by 1970, there was formal, national recognition of
the connection between local control and the failure to provide constitutionally-required legal representation.
The construction of national standards and the collection of relevant
data has not abated since it began.so NLADA, with the support of the
Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAF), created
the National Study Commission on Defense Services, which focused on
defender system structure, internal defender office structure, assigned

75. A list is available on the ABA's website. See CriminalJustice Standards, Am. BAR
ASS'N, http//www.americanbar.org/groups/criminaljustice/standards.html (lastvisited Jan.
19, 2016).
76. The second edition was adopted in 1979, the third edition in 1991, and the fourth
edition in February, 2015. See Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal
Justice Standardsfor the Prosecutionand Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1117
(2011). The National Legal and Defender Association has also been a leader in creating
standards for indigent defense representation. Their current Performance Guidelines for
Criminal Defense Representation were published in 1995. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, PERFORMANCE

GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION

http//www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/PerformanceGuidelines
Jan. 19, 2016).
77.

(1995),

(last visited

See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS' MODEL

PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT, at 1 (1970), http//nlada.net/sites/default/filesulcmodeldefender
act_1970.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Nat'l Right to Counsel Comm., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, at 32-34 (2009).
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counsel system structure, and workload; and they issued a report in
1976.1
In 1980, NLADA issued "Standards and Evaluation Design for
Appellate Defender Offices;" 8 2 in 1984, "Guidelines for Negotiating and
Awarding Governmental Contracts for Criminal Defense Services;"` in
1989, "Standards for the Administration of Assigned Counsel Systems;"8 4 and in 1997, "Defender Training and Development Standards."85 The DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance and Bureau of
Justice Statistics have sponsored a variety of research and publications," including data collection.
In 1981, the DOJ sponsored a
survey that produced national baseline data on the types of public
defense systems, their costs, and their caseloads.
In 1999, the DOJ
conducted a survey focusing on the twenty-one states where the state
government provided "virtually" all of the funding for indigent defense
services." A related study focused on indigent defense services in the
100 most populous counties.90 In 2010, the DOJ sponsored publications
describing and cataloging the operations of state, county, and locallybased public defender systems." Similarly, in 2002 the ABA Standing

81. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1976), http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/Guide

linesforLegalDefenseSystems (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
82. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, STANDARDS, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/
Defender Standards/DefenderStandardsNLADA (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT: THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1975); COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEMS: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2000); OPERATING
A DEFENDER OFFICE: PARTICIPANT'S HANDBOOK (1979).

87. But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing the Indigent Defense System, AM.
& POLICY (2010) (arguing that most data collection has been
with respect to felony representation, and there is a need for much more data regarding
indigent defense representation on misdemeanors).
88. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, CRIMINAL
DEFENSE SYSTEMS - A NATIONAL SURVEY, at 1 (1981), available at http://bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cds-ns.pdf.
CONSTITUTION Soc'Y FOR LAW

89. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, STATE FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, at 10 (Sept. 2001).
90. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999 (Nov. 2000).
91. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICES, 2007 (2010); LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007

(2010).
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Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants issued "The Ten
Principles Of a Public Defense Delivery System,"9 2 and in 2009 it
issued the "Eight Guidelines Of Public Defense Related to Caseloads.""
All of this is to say, there is no shortage of thoughtful work describing
both current and model indigent defense delivery systems. If national
criminal justice standards were a novelty at the time Gideon was
decided, today they are a common feature across the legal landscape.9 4
They have been cited in thousands of appellate court decisions, including
well over a hundred times by the United States Supreme Court.9 5 They
have been relied upon by legislatures both in creating public defender
systems and in revising substantive and procedural criminal law. They
have been incorporated into court rules and have been adopted for use
in attorney training and assessment. A number of state public defender
offices and state indigent defense systems have adopted performance
standards, normally modeled after the ABA or NLADA versions."
The result is that fifty-three years after Gideon, a great deal of hard
thinking about indigent defense administration has been done.
Implementing the systemic delivery of effective legal representation
demanded by Gideon remains a problem. However, the problem is not
that we do not know what to do. The problem is that we do not do it.
IV.

GEORGIA'S APPROACHES To GIDEON

Georgia's response to Gideon's trumpet has four phases.
Until
amendments to the fourth phase were made in 2015, Georgia consistently, if slowly, shifted away from local control over indigent defense
representation.
The first phase was simply business as usual. That is, the State of
Georgia did nothing in immediate response to Gideon. Indigent defense
representation was administered through the judiciary and funded by
the county or municipal governments. The state treasury was un-

92.

AM. BAR ASS'N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002),

available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid-indi
gent-defendants/1s sclaiddef_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
93. AM. BAR ASS'N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE
WORKLOADs (2009), available at http//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministra
tive/legal_aidindigent defendants/s-sclaid-def eight-guidelinesofLpublic-defense.auth
checkdam.pdf.
94. Marcus, supra note 74, at 10-13.
95. See, e.g., id.
96. Overall data on the nation-wide use of standards is not available, but widespread
use of at least some indigent defense standards is reported in Scott Wallace & David
Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31 S. U. L. REV.
272-74 (2004).
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touched. Generally, attorneys were appointed on a case-by-case basis by
the presiding judge.97
This judicial appointment system was common and was not unlike the
system evidenced in Powell v. Alabama9 8 or Betts v. Brady9 9 (the
Maryland case that Gideon overturned). The trial judge held the
appointment power and would appoint a member of the private bar to
represent an indigent defendant, at least in those cases where the trial
judge thought the appointment of counsel was necessary."oo Indeed,
Clarence Earl Gideon faced such a system in Florida when, on trial for
burglary, he requested that the judge appoint a lawyer to represent
him.10
In 1968, the State of Georgia passed the Georgia Criminal Justice
Act.1 02 The Act delegated the responsibility for indigent defense to
local superior court judges, who were required to establish an indigent
defense plan for each county.'o
The superior courts in Georgia are the courts of general jurisdiction.
They are organized into forty-nine judicial circuits, some including
several counties and some limited to a single county."o The district
attorneys are also organized by judicial circuit. Organizing indigent
defense responsibility by circuit would have fit these already welldefined jurisdictions. However, in 1968, Georgia was not ready to accept
that indigent defense representation needed the same structural and
organizational support as do district attorneys and superior court judges.
Indigent defense remained fragmented into what is nearly the smallest
unit of local control-the county. There are 159 counties in Georgia. 0 5
Georgia's next foray into state responsibility was the Georgia Indigent
Defense Act of 1979." The Act created the Georgia Indigent Defense
Council (GIDC). The GIDC was a "separate agency within the judicial

97. See 1968 Ga. Laws 1001.
98. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
99. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts, charged with robbery, requested that counsel be
appointed, and the trial court denied the request. Id. at 456-57.
100. Some states only allowed appointment of counsel in capital offenses. This was
true in Maryland, see id. at 456-57, and in Florida when Gideon was decided. Gideon, 372
U.S. at 337.
101. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
102. 1968 Ga. Laws 999-1007.
103. Id. at 1001-02.
104. Georgia Courts, GA. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, http://www.georgiacourts.
org/georgia-courts?menu=main (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
105. See Cities & Counties, STATE OF GA., http://georgia.gov/municipality-list (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
106. 1979 Ga. Laws 367.
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branch,"o' and it had three purposes. It was the fiscal officer for
various state monies distributed to the local indigent defense programs;... it recommended indigent defense guidelines to the Georgia
Supreme Court;o and it provided training and administrative support
for attorneys and local programs.1 o State funding was limited and
approximately eighty-nine percent of indigent defense remained locally
appropriated."'
The 1979 Act also recognized the need to create more independence
from the judiciary. It created "Local Tripartite Governing Committees"
and gave them the responsibility for creating local indigent defense
programs on a circuit-wide basis.1' 2 The fact that the chief superior
court judge for the circuit appointed one of the three members of the
somewhat undercut the committees'
local tripartite committee'
independence. Plus, many local systems still relied on judicial appointment of private lawyers to handle the indigent defense obligations, and
the tripartite committee structure did little to change that."' It
remained acceptable for the circuit "plan" to be case-by-case appointment
by the presiding judge. Moreover, the statute specifically stated a
preference for the appointment of "local" attorneys over non-local."'
Still, this was the first phase in which Georgia made significant
progress toward adopting statewide guidelines. As per its statutory
mission, the GIDC obtained the Georgia Supreme Court's approval of
The first guidelines were
guidelines to govern indigent defense.

107. Id. at 369.
108. Id. at 370. During this time some money was appropriated for indigent defense
by the legislature. The GIDC distributed funds to county indigent defense programs
according to various formulas, some of which incentivized local improvements in indigent
defense. The author was the Director of the public defender office in Athens, Georgia at
that time and is familiar with GIDC's work through the 1990s and until its replacement
by the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council in 2004.
109. Id. at 370, 372.
110. Id. at 370.
111. S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT
DEFENSE, at 2 (2002), available at https://www.schr.org/files/post/media/Blue%20Ribbon
%20Commission%2OReport.pdf.
112. 1979 Ga. Laws 372, 373.
113. Id.
114. REPORT, supra note 111, at 34-35.
115. 1979 Ga. Laws 368 (repealed by the Indigent Defense Act of 2003); see Amadeo v.
State, 259 Ga. 469, 469, 384 S.E.2d 181, 181 (1989) (reversing trial judge's appointment
of local counsel, who had no capital defense experience, instead of non-local counsel, though
defendant preferred non-local counsel, who had represented defendant for years and
successfully obtained reversal of his conviction and death sentence by the U.S. Supreme
Court).
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Caseload guidelines consistent with the ABA's

guidelines were adopted in

1999.117

The fourth phase for Georgia began in 2000, when Georgia Supreme
Court Justice Norman Fletcher created a state commission to study
indigent defense. The charge to the Supreme Court Commission on
Indigent Defense was to "study the status of indigent defense in Georgia,
to develop a strategic plan and to set a timetable for its implementation.""s
In 2002, the Commission issued a report in which it found that legal
representation for indigent criminal defendants in Georgia was severely
deficient. The report listed flaws in the system, seriatim: Georgia was
not providing adequate funding to fulfill the mandate of Gideon; Georgia
lacked a system of accountability and oversight; its fragmented county
system failed to fulfill the constitutional obligation of the State to
provide indigent defense representation; there was no effective statewide
structure to provide oversight and enforce Georgia Supreme Court rules
governing local indigent defense programs; most systems failed to impose
minimum eligibility requirements for the attorneys who were representing indigent defendants; there was no comprehensive data collection and
therefore no reliable statistics regarding indigent defense services in the
state; litigation against local indigent defense systems had been
successful, was likely to be brought again and to be successful again; and
"reform of the Georgia system by the appropriate legislative and
executive policy makers is far preferable to reform by litigation in the
state and federal courts."" 9
The Commission made several specific recommendations.
These
included that the State adequately fund indigent defense and that it
reorganize the delivery system to ensure accountability, uniform quality,
enforceability of standards, and constitutionally adequate representation.
It recommended the creation of a state-wide system of public defender
offices organized at the circuit level, and that the state adopt principles
governing the delivery of indigent defense services, performance
standards by which defense attorneys could be evaluated, and a
comprehensive data collection system designed to allow assessment of
the legal representation being provided. 2 0

116.

REPORT, supra note 111, at 31-32.

117.

GUIDELINES OF THE GEORGIA INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNCIL FOR THE OPERATION OF

LOCAL INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Nov. 1999) (Georgia Indigent Defense Council,
approved by the Georgia Supreme Court).
118. REPORT, supra note 111, at 1.
119. Id. at 3-5.
120. Id. at 5-6.
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In response, the Georgia General Assembly passed the Georgia
Indigent Defense Act of 2003.121 The Act created a statewide public
defender system organized by judicial circuits and authorized to take
cases in the superior and juvenile courts.'2 2 The legislation took into
account the Commission's strong recommendation that the public
defender system be governed by uniform standards, reinforced by
evidence in the form of data about individual public defender offices. It
not only required the state to draft and enforce performance and other
standards, but it also named the governing body the "Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council" (GPDSC).'2 3 It was an "independent
agency within the judicial branch of state government."l 2 4
The Act set forth a list of standards for performance, for public
defenders, for caseloads, and for structure of public defender offices to be
drafted, adopted, and implemented by the GPDSC. Specifically named
standards included "[standards for maintaining and operating circuit
defender offices"; "[s]tandards for assistant public defender and
appointed counsel caseloads"; "[s]tandards for the performance of
assistant public defenders and appointed counsel representing indigent
persons"; and "[s]tandards for qualifications and performance of counsel
representing indigent persons in capital cases." 25
The newly created GPDSC quickly approved the following: Performance Standards for Public Defenders and Attorneys who handle
Indigent Defense Cases,' Maximum Caseload Standards, and Standards for Attorneys Representing Indigent Juveniles in Juvenile Court
Delinquency Cases.'27

121. 2003 Ga. Laws 191 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-1 to -128 (2004)).
122. Id. at 191-92. The Act did not extend coverage to misdemeanor-only courts. More
serious misdemeanors include domestic violence batteries and related offenses, and driving
under the influence. Id.
123. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-3(a) (2003). As noted infra, the Act has been amended and the
name changed.
124. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-1(b) (2003). As noted infra, the Act has been amended and the
agency moved to the executive branch.
125. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-8(b) (2003). This has been subsequently amended and purged
of all references to "standards." See Ga. H.R. Bill 328, Reg. Sess. (2015).
126. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-8(b); see also GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL,
STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION

IN INDIGENT CRIMINAL CASES,

available at http//www.law.uga.edu/sites/default/files/GPDSC%20Performance%2OStand
ards.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
127. See, e.g., Sarah Gerwig-Moore & Leigh Schrope, Hush, Little Baby, Don't Say a
Word: How Seeking The "Best Interests of The Child" Fostered a Lack ofAccountability In
Georgia'sJuvenile Courts, 58 MERCER L. REV. 531, 540 (2007). Interestingly, other states
that were adopting statewide public defender systems looked to Georgia's adoption of
standards with admiration and adopted similar standards.
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The standards the GPDSC approved were derived from the earlier
standards submitted to the GIDC and adopted as guidelines by the
Georgia Supreme Court, and from national standards. They were
altered somewhat in the final GPDSC-approved versions.'2 8 Take, for
instance, the caseload standard of 150 felony cases per attorney per year.
This is the same as the ABA and NLADA caseload standard, originally
promulgated in 1973,'129 and is identical to the GIDC guideline approved by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1999.1"0
Despite the fact that the imposition of uniform standards was a
primary recommendation of the Georgia Supreme Court Commission and
was one of the outstanding features of Georgia's 2003 Indigent Defense
Act, in 2015, Georgia amended the Act and totally eliminated the
founding principle of uniform state standards. Georgia purged the word
"standards" from the Act.1 3 ' The GPDSC became the Georgia Public
Defender Council (GPDC).
Gone is the council's authority and responsibility to approve and
implement "programs, services, policies, and standards as may be
necessary to fulfill the purposes and provisions of this chapter."1 3 2
Gone is the director's authority to "carry into effect the minimum
standards and policies promulgated by the council."'
Gone is the
director's obligation to "supervise compliance with policies and standards
adopted by the council."'34
The GPDC still controls the purse strings and its Director has the
authority to remove a Circuit Public Defender (CPD), though only for
cause."' The director still has the responsibility of evaluating the
CPD's job performance,"' which arguably should be done with uniform
job performance criteria. This responsibility to evaluate the CPD is
awkward at best, doomed to failure at worst, given the legislature's

128. The Author participated in drafting the GPDSC standards as an ex officio member
of the first Council.
129.

NATL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE, Rule 13.12,

http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/StandardsForTheDefense
(last
visited Jan. 19, 2016).
130. GUIDELINES, supra note 116.
131. Ga. H.R. Bill 328, Reg. Sess., Part VII.
132. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-8(b) (2013).
133. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-5(c)(2) (2013).
134. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-5(d)(3) (2013).
135. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-20(c) (Supp. 2015).
136. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-5(d)(12) (Supp. 2015). There is also a more convoluted method
for seeking "remonstrance" when a Circuit Public Defender is underperforming. The local
supervisory panel, all of whom are lawyers who practice in the local jurisdiction, can make
a recommendation to the GPDC Director to look into the matter and take appropriate
action.

2016]

PUBLIC DEFENDERS

647

express removal of the authority to create standards (though absent this
history, the adoption of standards would appear to be an implied power
consistent with the GPDC's oversight obligation).
Thus, though national standards for criminal justice are decades old,
well established, adopted by a number of other states, and cited in
thousands of judicial opinions, the traditional adherence to local control
resurfaced in response to the imposition of standards by the GPDSC.
The idea that Georgia's localized criminal justice system would have to
answer to scrutiny from a council in Atlanta hit a historically-sympathetic nerve.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is always a balance to be struck between local and centralized
control. That balance will be struck differently depending on many
factors, especially the nature of the actual work to be done. However,
the track record is important.
Wittingly, or not, the shift to more local control of the public defender
system resonates with the historic patterns of governmental structure
designed by southern politicians to avoid the input or scrutiny from
"outside agitators" (to use the language of the Southern Manifesto).
Admittedly, the GPDSC was doing very little with standards and indeed
was doing very little evaluation or assessment of public defender
performance. The head of the Georgia Circuit Public Defender Association, commenting on the proposed legislation to remove standards, said,
"I don't think this proposed statute would change anything regarding
how (circuit public defenders) actually operate."'
It is worth noting that in a variety of other areas Georgia has been
willing to adopt national standards or approaches to law and regulation.
For instance, the legislature has incorporated the Model Penal Code into
its criminal codel38 and has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,' and the Georgia Bar has adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.

40

137. Sam Merritt, as quoted in Bill Rankin, Georgia Legislative ProposalsCould Gut
Public Defender Reforms, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 1, 2015), http/www.1yajc.com/news/
news/local/georgia-legislative-proposals-could-gut-public-def/nkLKR/. At that time and as
of this writing, Merritt is the Circuit Public Defender in the Southwestern Judicial Circuit.
138. See, e.g., 1968 Ga. Laws 1249.
139. See Paul Milich, Georgia'sNew Evidence Code:An Overview, 28 GA. STATE UNIV.
L. REv. 379 (2011).
140. The Georgia Supreme Court adopted the Model RuleA of Professional Conduct on
June 12, 2000. Id. at 383.
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Why then, in the arena of providing advocacy for poor people, has
Georgia been so reluctant to accept the perspective of the national legal
community? While Southern history is rich in many ways, loyalty to
that history demands that we see it for what it is. That history is
defined by the stubborn perpetuation of racial caste, and without
question the courts and the criminal law have been major players in that
project. Criminal defendants are not a popular cause anywhere. But in
the South, the cause of the criminal defendant summoned before the bar
of the local courts has, for generation upon generation, been the cause
of the racial minority.
The State of Georgia, to its credit, faced up to this history in its 2003
Indigent Defense Act. The Commission Report that gave rise to the Act
documented the need for major improvements in Georgia's system for
complying with Gideon. The national legal community has expressed
this concern, nationwide, since the 1960s. Gideon was as much a part
of that national understanding as it was the spark that lit it. Forty
years hence, Georgia caught up. Fifty years hence, it backed down.
The attorneys in the Circuit Public Defenders offices make valiant
efforts on behalf of their clients every day. However, while the daily
repetition of decision-making and the familiarity of the repeat players
can be a boon to efficiency, the customary exercise of power and the
expectations of privilege that customs generates can also be a barrier to
equality. The repeat players grow accustomed to the pattern, and the
comfort of familiarity legitimizes it. The system grows unresponsive to
alternative voices, whether those voices are outside the mainstream yet
local, or outside the mainstream and "foreign."
To be clear, this is not a hunt for explicit racial bias. Rather, the
question is whether the strength of loyalty to local control, or of the
resistance to outside influence, is a leftover artifact from centuries of
racist hierarchy and a reliance on local control in service of maintaining
that hierarchy. It is at least plausible that the cultural inheritance of
structure, tied to racial caste, might beget patterns that reproduce racial
disparity, even if the explicit animus has been buried. Should we not at
least post a sign saying, "Warning, there be danger ahead?" Or, to state
the positive case-does it not make sense to build in oversight based on
national standards? It is not a question of strict adherence to someone
else's rules-the standards are not designed for rigid application.
Rather, it is a matter of opening ourselves up to scrutiny in the hope
that the diversity of views will produce the best possible outcomes.
Ultimately, this is about the clients, all indigent, up against the power
of the state. Is there any reason to think that defendants, as a group,
voiceless and at the bottom of the power hierarchy, would not want their
attorney to measure up to national standards? Would they not welcome
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outside scrutiny-and therefore outside support-of their public defender
office? Would they appreciate the patterns of local control, historic and
present day, and would they hope for an exit from the historical
patterns? After all, it is the defendant to whom the constitution
guaratees "The assistance of counsel for his defense."

